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“AGREEING TO DISAGREE”:
F ILLING G APS IN D ELIBERATELY INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
Omri Ben -Shahar*

Abstract
This Article develops a new standard for gap filling in incomplete
contracts. It focuses on an important class of situations in which
parties leave their agreement deliberately incomplete, with the intent
to further negotiate and resolve the remaining issues. In these
situations, neither the traditional no-enforcement result nor the usual
gap filling approaches accord with the parties’ partial consent.
Instead, the Article develops the concept of pro-defendant gap-fillers,
under which each party is granted an option to enforce the transaction
supplemented with terms most favorable (within reason) to the other
party. A deliberately incomplete contract with pro-defendant gap
fillers transforms into two complete contracts, each favorable to a
different party, with each party entitled to enforce only the contract
favorable to her opponent. Under this approach, partial consent gives
rise to a correspondingly intermediate burden of liability. The Article
demonstrates that this regime promotes the interests of negotiating
parties who enter agreements-to-agree. It also identifies various
doctrinal practices that already incorporate the pro-defendant gap
filling logic.
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INTRODUCTION
Incomplete contracts have always been viewed as raising the
following challenge for contract law. Does the incompleteness—or,
“indefiniteness”, as it is usually called—rise to such a level that
renders the agreement legally unenforceable? When the indefiniteness
concerns important terms, it is presumed that the parties have not
reached an agreement to which they intend to be bound. This
“fundamental policy” is the upshot of the view that “contracts should
be made by the parties, not by the courts.”1 When, in contrast, the
indefiniteness concerns less important terms, courts supplement the
agreement with gap fillers and enforce the supplemented contract.
The common law has traditionally tended towards the no-contract
outcome. For example, an agreement to pay an employee “a fair share”
of the profits, without specifying the precise fraction, was too
indefinite to be enforced. 2 This traditional result has been weakene d
under the Code’s “contract with open terms” approach, that more
aggressively supplements the parties’ agreement with reasonable or
average terms, including price terms. 3
While many areas of contracting have witnessed significant shifts
from the formalist no-contract outcome to the more liberal gap filling
and enforcement approach embodied in the Code, both the traditional
common law and the Code share the premise that the problem of
indefiniteness is of a dichotomous nature: either a full-blown contract
can be assembled with the aid of gap-fillers, or no contract exists.
These are the only two choices. Regimes and jurisdictions may differ
as to where the contract/no-contract boundary lies, but they all follow
the all-or-nothing methodology.
This Article proposes a different methodology. It advances the idea
that partial agreements may deserve partial enforcement. If a deal is
only partially struck—if it contains pockets of indefiniteness—the law
should not be limited to choosing polar solutions, full enfor cement
versus no enforcement, but should instead have available an
intermediate solution, of holding the parties accountable only to the
definite parts of the agreement. The more definite the deal is, the
greater the contractual liability.

________________________________________________________
1

Restatement 2d of Contracts, § 33(2), cmt b.
2
See, e.g., Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822 (N.Y 1916).
3

Uniform Commercial Code 2-305.
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The Article identifies an important category of situations in which
parties intentionally drafted their agreement indefinite, leaving issues
that were difficult to resolve for future completion. In these situations,
contractual incompleteness is neither a result of haste nor of
unforeseeability, but rather a deliberate choice to temporarily disagree
over some matters, to sidestep difficult issues over which consensus
could not be reached. It is here, in the presence of partial assent, that
“partial enforcement” could be desirable.
The Article argues that the familiar standards of filling gaps, using
either reasonable hypothetical consent (a.k.a. “mimicking”, or
“majoritarian” default rules) or information-forcing one -sided
provisions (a.k.a. “penalty” default rules), are not suitable for filling
gaps in such deliberately incomplete contracts. They are not suitable
because they provide definitive default terms, which prevent the parties
from leaving their deal legally binding and incomplete. That is, under
the familiar standard of gap filling, if parties recognize and anticipate
the content of the gap filler, the set of legal obligations governing the
transaction—whether explicit or supplemented—is no longer
incomplete. Effectively, then, in the presence of definitive default
terms, no additional assent is needed, and the parties are deprived of
the power—which they may have sought to maintain—to affirmatively
approve or veto the missing terms.
Instead, the Article proposes a new approach to gap filling: a party
who seeks enforcement of a deliberately incomplete agreement would
be granted an option to enforce the transaction under the agreed-upon
terms supplemented with terms that are the most favorable (within
reason) to the defendant. I will call this gap filling principle a “prodefendant” default rule. If, say, a buyer and a seller agree on many
provisions but leave others, such as payment terms, “to be agreed
upon”, each party should be able to enforce a deal supplemented by
payment terms that are most favorable to the othe r party. The buyer
should be able to enforce a deal in which payment is made in cash, in
full, upfront; and the seller should be able to enforce a deal in which
the buyer is granted the credit terms that the buyer sought. The
incomplete contract is supplement by a “decoupled” default provision,
either payment in cash or lenient credit terms, depending on the
identity of the enforcing party. Effectively, a deliberately incomplete
contract becomes the legal equivalent of two complete contracts, each
favorable to a different party, with each party entitled to enforce only
the contract favorable to her opponent.
To understand the novelty of this gap-filling approach, compare its
prescription to those of other gap-filling approaches in a contract with
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a missing price. For example, consider a landlord and a tenant who
agreed on the subject matter of the lease and all other terms, but left
the price term open. Imagine that the reasonable monthly rent for such
property varies from $3000 to $5000. Under the “mimicking”
approach to gap filling, the court ought to set a “fair and reasonable”
price, reflecting the rent in the majority of comparable leases, that is,
somewhere between $3000 and $5000, perhaps $4000. Under the
“penalty” default rule approach, the court might want to set the price
biased against the party who drafted the agreement (contraproferentem), to provide her incentives to draft the price term
explicitly. If it were the landlord who drafted the vague contract, the
supplemented price would be $3000. Under the pro-defendant gap
filling approach that is developed here, the price term would depend
on the party seeking enforcement. If the tenant is the one trying to
enforce the deal, she can only do so under a price of $5000, most
favorable to the landlord. And if it is the landlord who is suing for
enforcement, he can only get a price of $3000, most favorable to the
tenant.
Of course, the selection of a gap-filling standard should not be
arbitrary, but should depend on the reason for the incompleteness.
Thus, the mimicking gap-filler should apply when the parties wanted
to save the cost of explicit agreement and intended to apply an
“average” or market term. The penalty gap-filler should apply when
one of the parties—here, the landlord—is responsible for the
vagueness and could have resolved it cheaply by making an explicit
stipulation. And, along the argument that will be developed in this
Article, the pro-defendant gap-filler should apply when the parties
failed to reach consensus over this issue and left it deliberately
indefinite. Specifically, it should apply in the common scenario in
which the parties left this term “to be agreed upon”, that is, when they
preserved mutual veto power.
The Article develops various justifications for the pro-defendant
gap filling approach. First, it suggests that, on conceptual grounds, this
outcome reflects more precisely the intent of the parties who drafted a
deliberately indefinite agreement or an agreement-to-agree. These
parties have reached some consensus, a partial commitment, and thus a
no-contract result would frustrate their achievement. But at the same
time they failed to reach consent over the missing term, rendering the
presumption of “hypothetical consent”—which lies at the bottom of
the mimicking default rule —false. Further, while it is reasonable for
the defendant to reject a court-imposed “compromise” term, on the
basis that she explicitly reserved her right to veto such compromises in

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004

5

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 2 [2004]

AGREEING TO DISAGREE

4

the hope of securing better-than-average terms, it would be
unreasonable for the defendant to reject a deal containing her most
favorable terms. Surely, when she entered the indefinite agreement, the
best terms she must have intended to secure are these “most favorable”
terms (although she may have soberly hoped to get terms tha t are less
one-sided). What grounds, then, does the defendant now have to reject
a deal that grants her such terms? Such one-sided deal, we can say for
certain, is the one deal that does not conflict with the enforced-against
party’s initial intent. Although she reserved the veto power, it is not
such favorable terms that she intended to veto.
Further, the Article suggests that the pro-defendant gap-filling
approach serves additional goals. First, it will be shown that this
regime provides parties in negotiations with greater security against
unilateral retractions by their counterparts, thus enhancing the
incentives to make precontractual investments. This, in turn, also
increases the overall contractual “pie”. Second, the binding nature of
precontractual agreements enables parties to break down the “big”
commitment into smaller, piecemeal, commitments, accumulated
sequentially. These two effects increase the chances that negotiations
will succeed and that full agreement will eventually be achieved.
The proposed pro-defendant gap-filling approach is not merely a
theoretical possibility, but rather a viable technique recognized (and
occasionally applied) by courts adjudicating incomplete agreements.
Section IV of this Article will survey the variety of contexts in which
courts have considered pro-defendant gap-fillers, and how courts
managed to identify the content of the defendant’s most favorable
term. To briefly illustrate one such context, consider the case of
Ontario Downs v. Lauppe,4 which involved an agr eement for the sale
of 16 acres of land for $50,000, but left for further agreement where,
within the seller’s 450-acre lot, would the 16-acre parcel lie. The
negotiations were not yet resumed and the lot was never identified,
when the seller retracted. In the suit by the buyer, the court rejected the
no-contract outcome but also refused to designate a reasonable parcel.
Instead, the court instructed that the contract can only be enforced with
respect to a parcel that seller would designate. Effectively, the contract
was supplemented with a term (parcel) most favorable to the
seller/defendant.
Similarly, there is a substantial line of cases in which the parties
left the payment terms “to be agreed upon”, where courts applied the
doctrine of “cure by concession” and allowed the buyer to enforce the
________________________________________________________
4

192 Cal.App.2d 697, 13 Cal.Rptr. 782 (1961)
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deal if she agrees to make a full payment in cash and with no delay,
namely, in a manner most favorable to the seller. 5 When the agreement
is supplemented in such a pro-defendant manner, “there is no longer
any way that the provision may be construed to [the defendant’s]
detriment”,6 and thus it is guaranteed not to violate the defendant’s
original intent.
The Article develops the theory of pro-defendant gap fillers in four
parts. Part I briefly reviews the law of indefiniteness and the existing
theory of gap filling. Part II identifies situations in which contracts are
left deliberately incomplete and demonstrates that existing standards of
gap filling do not provide an adequate solution to these situations. Part
III develops the concept of pro-defendant default provisions, and
argues that they are uniquely suitable to fill gaps in deliberately
incomplete contracts. Finally, part IV explores, as just explained,
various doctrinal uses of the pro-defendant gap filling technique.
I. INDEFINITE A GREEMENTS AND GAP F ILLING
A. The Law of Gap Filling
1. The Problem of Indefiniteness
A contract is indefinite when it does not address a material aspect
of the deal. Some seemingly unresolved aspects could be overcome by
courts through liberal interpretation of meaning or by reference to
context (e.g., prior oral agreements, course of performance). But other
unresolved aspects cannot: the parties simply failed to reach agreement
or to manifest any type of inferable assent over these matters. These
are the contracts suffering from indefiniteness.
Traditionally, common law regarded indefinite contracts as lacking
mutual assent and unenforceable. The justification for this policy was
often stated in terms of an absence of intent -to-be-bound. Since the
underlying question is always whether the parties intended to contract,
the more issues left unresolved, the stronger is the inference that no
such intent ripened. 7 Accordingly, if the missing terms were
sufficiently material, the cont ract would have been unenforceable.
________________________________________________________
5

6
7

Restatement 2d of Contracts §33, lll. 2 (“A agrees to sell and B to buy a specific tract of land
for $10,000 […] and to lend B the amount, but the term of the loan are not stated […]. The
contract is too indefinite to [enforce] against B, but B may [enforce it] if he offer to pay the
full price in cash”.)
Busching v. Griffin, 542 So.2d 860, 864 (Miss. 1989).
See, e.g., Schade v. Diethrick, 760 P.2d 1050, 1058 (Ariz. 1988) (The requirement of
definiteness is “a factor relevant to determining the ultimate element of contract formation—
the question whether the parties manifested assent or intent to be bound”); Restatment 2d of
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This approach, often viewed as formalistic and harsh, was
reformed under the Uniform Commercial Code. Under the Code,
indefiniteness—whether inadvertent or a result of inability to agree—
can be cured by filling the gaps . Indeed, the Code provides gap-fillers
for almost every aspect of the deal, and gives broad permission for
courts to fill gaps by incorporating practices and unwritten customs. 8
Here, too, the underlying principle is that the parties’ intent to contract
should be the ultimate test. However, the Code’s gap-filling
jurisprudence is founded on a different empirical basis. The empirical
premise is that agreements are intended by the parties to be binding
even if they leave, as they often do, many terms open.
There is some debate as to whether modern courts take the doctrine
of indefiniteness seriously. On the one hand, the Code’s liberal gapfilling platform, imitated by the Restatement,9 gives grounds for the
belief that parties can nowadays enforce contracts with almost any
term left open, as long as the circumstances indicate the intent to be
bound. Gap fillers are available on price, duration, payment and
delivery terms, and many others, effectively constituting a
standardized statutory contract. 10 On the other hand, some evidence
has recently been collected that the doctrine of indefiniteness
continues to play a major role in court decisions, barring the
supplementation and enforcement of gap-ridden agreements. 11
However, regardless of the extent to which the doctrine of
indefiniteness continues to bar enforcement, it is clear that both the
traditional common law and the Code regard indefinite contracts as
posing a problem of binary choice: either a full-blown contract can be
assembled with the aid of gap fillers, or the contract is unenforceable.
All, or nothing. No other choice and no intermediate solution exist.
2. Agreements to Agree
Agreements to agree are a particular type of indefinite agreement
that have received special attention and have been adjudged under a
more particularized set of rules. In agreements to agree, parties
affirmatively acknowledge the indefiniteness of their agreement, and
state their intent—or hope—that further negotiations will ensue and
Contracts §33 cmt. c (“The more terms the parties leave open, the less likely it is the they have
intended to conclude a binding agreement”.)
8
9
10
11

UCC 2-204(3).
Restatment 2d of Contract §33.
White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, Ch. 3 (4th Ed. 1995)
Robert E. Scott, The Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 104 Colum. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2004) (analyzing a sample of cases with indefinite contracts, many of which
were not enforced.)
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enable them to reach a more complete agreement. When the “further
negotiations” fail and no further agreement emerges, courts are usually
unwilling to apply gap-fillers and enforce the contract.12 Interestingly,
the missing terms—which the parties left to be further negotiated and
to agree upon—are no more material than terms that courts readily
supplement into other indefinite agreements. 13 It is not the materiality
of the terms per se that prevents gap filling, but rather the fact that the
parties explicitly identified them as the subject matter for further
affirmative agreement. Apparently, the inference many courts draw is
that when parties agree to agree, they have not yet agreed—they do not
yet intend to be bound. Such “agreements” merely mark a stage in the
precontractual negotiations in which certain substance has been
resolved and should be memorialized.
While agreements to agree are normally deemed unenforceable,
other closely related forms of preliminary agreements are more
regularly enforced. For example, “agreements in principle” or
agreements “subject to a contract”, in which parties draft the outline of
their agreement and acknowledge that some details need to be worked
out, are held enforceable even in cases where they are quite bare. 14
It might appear, then, that the jurisprudence of precontractual
agreements in general, and of agreement to agree in particular, exhibits
that same “all or nothing” feature that characterizes the doctrine of
indefiniteness. Either the precontractual agreement manifests sufficient
intent to be bound so as to be supplemented and enforced, or it does
not manifest such intent and is unenforceable. In this area of
precontractual liability, however, the all-or-nothing characteristic has
eroded some. In practice, even when the agreement does not rise to a
full-blown contract and is deemed unenforceable for the purpose of
contractual remedies, the parties’ freedom to walk away from it has
been somewhat limited by courts. With the emergence of the good
faith jurisprudence in common law, courts have increasingly limited
the privilege of parties, who made serious albeit partial precontractual
manifestations of intent, to retract.15 The freedom from contract that
parties in these situations historically enjoyed was constrained.
________________________________________________________
12
13
14
15

1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §2.8 (Rev. Ed. 1993).
Cite an example
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 673, 67981 (1969) (explaining the emergence of the obligation to negotiate in good faith as an
intermediate solution between the traditional all or nothing results); Farnsworth,
Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations,
87 Colum. L. Rev. 217 (1987).
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Specifically many courts have been requiring pa rties who entered
agreements to agree to indeed make an honest effort to reach an
agreement, and tailor some measure of reliance liability to a breach of
this duty. 16 Accordingly, an arbitrary decision by a party to walk away
from the negotiation could be regarded as breach of the good faith
obligation.
B. The Theory of Gap Filling
Filling gaps in incomplete contracts was elevated from a contextspecific inquiry to a generalizable “theory” when it was noticed that
while contractual gaps vary in contexts and in substance, there are
unifying rationales to filling them. Although gaps concerning, say,
contingent voting rights in a complex merger agreement have nothing
in common with gaps concerning, say, missing payment dates in a
lease contract, the formulae by which the law fills these gaps—what
judges have to consider in order to generate the gap-filler—may have a
lot in common.
Put differently, the reason there can be unified theories of gapfilling is the recognition that there exist systematic sources for
incompleteness. Gaps in contracts are not random “holes”, but arise
from identified imperfections in the negotiation process. Diagnosing
these imperfections yields solutions for redressing them, namely,
standards for filling the gaps.
Accordingly, it of ten said that there exist two distinct efficiencybased theories for gap filling. 17 Each of these theories diagnoses a
different reason for the contractual incompleteness, and provides gapfillers that address the diagnosed source of incompleteness. In orde r to
succeed in developing an additional theory of gap filling, it will be
necessary to identify a different source of incompleteness, one that is
not addressed by existing gap-filling formulae. Before doing that,
however, let us briefly recall the existin g theories.

________________________________________________________
16

See, e.g., Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America v. Tribune Co., 670 F.
Supp.491 (1987).] Some courts, while following Tribune, assign expectation liability for the
breach of “Tribune- duties”. See, e.g., Venture Assocs. v. Zenith Data Sys., 987 f.2d 429 (7th
Cir. 1993) (unless too uncertain, expectation remedies should be awarded).
17
See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Law: General Theories, in 3 Encyclopedia of Law and
Economics 1 (Bouckaert and De Geest eds., 2000); Ian Ayres, Default Rules for Incomplete
Contracts, 1 The New Palgrave Dictionary for Economics and the Law 585 (Peter Newman,
ed., 1998). For the argument that the two gap-filling theories are merely two perspectives on
one unifying approach, see Bebchuk and Shavell, Reconsidering Contractual Liability and the
Incentive to Reveal Information, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1615 (1999).
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1. Mimic the Parties’ Will
One reason for incompleteness is the cost of drafting a complete
agreement. An agreement that addresses all possible contingencies
involves costly negotiations and drafting. The underlying premise is
that a complete contingent agreement can be reached, if only the
parties invest sufficient effort and attention to the details. But the cost
of attending to the fine details and to remote contingencies may exceed
the benefit from doing so, making it rational to leave gaps in the
agreement.18
The assumption that transactions costs are the reason for
incompleteness generates a “mimicking” principle of gap filling. The
law should equate the missing provisions with the hypothetical
consent—the terms the parties would have agreed upon. By mimicking
the parties’ hypothetical will, the law is enabling the parties to save the
transactions costs of drafting these very same terms expressly. Or, put
differently, by correctly mimicking the parties’ will, the law is
enabling the parties to save the transactions costs of expressly opting
out of the legal default rules.
The mimicking theory is based on a premise that there exists an
underlying “will”, or hypothetical consent. Namely, there are specific
definitive terms which, had the parties paid sufficient attention to the
matter, they would have rationally agreed upon. The only challenge is
to identify these terms. Accordingly, if the judicial task of identifying
the hypothetical consent is straightforward, courts can tailor
individually optimal gap fillers: ones that are rational for these parties.
And if the judicial task of identifying the hypothetical consent is more
difficult, in light of the heterogeneity of contracting parties and the
uncertainty concerning the circumstances, courts could use
“majoritarian” or “one -size-fits-all” default rules: ones that are rational
for most similarly-situated parties. 19 Either way, the rationale for
choosing the content of any default provision is to minimize
transactions costs: the cost of opting into specific terms. Mimicking
defaults appropriately addresses the drafting cost source of
incompleteness.

________________________________________________________
18
19

EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, T HE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW ; Craswell, supra
note 17, at 3.
Ayres, supra note 17, at 586.
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2. Penalty Defaults20
Another reason for incompleteness of a contract has to do with
information asymmetry. When parties are differently informed about
an aspect of the deal, they may either draft provisions that are suboptimal, or neglect to address an issue that otherwise, in the presence
of perfect information, would have been addressed. For example, a
party may fail to alert her counterpart to the fact that she assigns
idiosyncratically high value to performance, resulting in the
counterpart failure to take the necessary higher precaution against
breach. Since private information can be advantageous, it may not be
revealed, leaving the agreement—which should optimally be tailored
to the content of this information—incomplete.
If the one-sidedness of information is the cause of contractual
incompleteness, gap-fillers can be designed to induce information
sharing. They can do so by “punishing” the informed party. If, in the
presence of contractual silence, the default provision is unfavorable to
the informed party, this party will be induced to opt-out of it by
drafting an express provision. In the process of reaching such an
express agreement, information is shared and the information
asymmetry is overcome. Thus, for example, if the default remedy for
breach of contract is limited to “average” or foreseeable damages, the
party who stands to suffer high idiosyncratic profit loss from breach
will have the incentive to draft a higher liquidated damage provision,
thereby communicating her private information about her expected
profit. Such gap-fillers are often named ‘information-forcing’ default
rules.
3. Definitive Default Rules
The mimic -the-parties’ will and the penalty defaults approaches
share at least one important common feature: they both supplement the
parties’ obligation with a definitive provision. To the extent that the
parties can anticipate what the gap-filler would be—and both theories
rely on the parties’ ability to anticipate the gap-fillers 21—the set of
legal obligations governing the transaction is fully determined.
________________________________________________________
20

21

The term “penalty defaults” was coined in Ayres and Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J 87 (1989). A similar
information-cost theory of gap-filling was developed contemporaneously by Bebchuk and
Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v.
Baxendale, 7 J.L., Econ. & Org. 284 (1991).
Craswell, supra note 17.
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Whether the obligations are based on express provisions or on legally
supplied default terms, they are definitive. 22
But definitive default terms are not the only conceptual way to deal
with ambiguity. Consider by analogy computer software. Programs
always start with preset defaults that usually represent the average
user’s preferences—what most people would have selected if they had
the chance to try and experience different settings. These are definitive
majoritarian defaults. (One can also imagine penalty defaults, utilizing
settings that most users would not want, eliciting setting reversals and
“preference revelation”.) But some features are set such that no prior
setting is selected, requiring that the user will make an affirmative
selection (e.g., click one of several buttons), or else the feature will not
be activated and the process will be stalled. These are non-definitive
defaults: the settings are not fully determined (although they might be
“narrowed down”), but, as a result of the different selections made by
different users, the program will eventually run with each user’s most
favorable setting. In the analysis below, I will argue that contractual
ambiguity could potentially be dealt with in a similar manner, utilizing
non-definitive default terms.
II.

DELIBERATE INCOMPLETENESS

A. When Do Parties Prefer Indefiniteness?
Once it is concluded that the parties entered in to a binding
agreement, default rules—whether mimicking or penalty defaults—
supplement any incompleteness in the agreement with definitive and
predictable terms. This basic feature of gap-filling law has the
implication that parties cannot create liability while leaving any of
their obligations legally blank. If they want to create liability, then
whatever obligation they leave unresolved, the law would eventually
supply. True, it might be unclear, at the time of the agreement, how the
law would supplement the missing term, but it is clear that if the
agreement would be held binding, it would be supplemented. Thus,
imagine a situation in which parties who negotiate over an aspect of
the deal cannot reach consent. If they leave this issue open, and if the
gap is not too severe to render the contract unenforceable due to
indefiniteness, a gap filler will kick in, resolving the open issue. But
the parties would anticipate this and realize that leaving a blank is
________________________________________________________
22

Indeed, by its legal definition a “contract” cannot be incomplete. UCC § 1-201 (11) defines
“contract” as “the total obligation which results from the parties’ agreement as affected by this
Act,” namely, including all the gap-fillers.
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equivalent to agreeing on a definitive term that is identical to the gap
filler. That is, when gaps are filled by definitive default provisions,
parties are effectively precluded from leaving an issue unresolved.
This feature of contract law could, at times, conflict with the
parties’ interests. In the discussion to follow, I will argue that there is
both a theoretical and an empirical basis for the claim that parties have
an interest in unresolved agreements. In a nutshell, the parties may
want to leave an issue unresolved when they want actual, rather than
inferred consent to govern. That is, each party may seek to maintain a
“veto power” over the specific term—to avoid having to surrender to a
“compromise” which she never embraced. Parties may seek to
maintain the power to reject any undesired term. Once this claim is
established, it will provide the necessary foundation for a different
approach to gap filling, one that does not utilized definitive defaults.
1. Conceptual Grounds
Can rational parties choose to leave part of their agreement
deliberate ly incomplete? One way to think about this, which was
offered in a thought-provoking and influential Article by
mathematician Robert Aumann, is to characterize situations in which
parties may agree to disagree.23 Aumann showed this to be possible,
by identifying the conditions for the opposite to be true: when is it that
parties cannot agree to disagree. The logic of his claim is, roughly, the
following. If one party knows that the other party’s view is different
from his own, she should revise her own view so as to take into
account the fact that the other party may have some different
information justifying her view.24 The other party would follow the
same updating process. Thus, for example, if two doctors have
differing views/predictions on how a certain medical procedure would
affect the patient, each basing her view on her own prior experience,
each would rely on the other doctor’s position as a valid reason to
update her own. As long as their views are different, this convergenceby-inferences dynamic will remain in action. In equilibrium, the
parties’ views will converge.
The lesson from Aumann’s insight is not that disagreements are
impossible, but rather that: different opinions or views among rational
parties can be maintained only in the presence of initial biases or
________________________________________________________
23
24

Robert J. Aumann, Agreeing to Disagree, 4 Annals of Statistics 1236 (1976)
More precisely, a player’s updating should occur only if the player shares common “priors”,
such that a player can attribute the opponent’s differing view to “new information”, rather than
a “bias”. It also requires that the shared priors be common knowledge. See, e.g., Fudenberg &
Tirole, Game Theory 548-9 (1991).
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prejudices. In the doctors example, they may remain in disagreement
if, say, each considers her own training as superior (a “prejudice”), or
if each is influenced by the salience of her own prior experience (a
“bias”). Disagreements cannot be solely attributed to one -sided
information. Information-based differences in views “wash out”. 25
Aumann’s theorem, by articulating the conditions under which
disagreement would be overcome tells us also the flip side, namely,
when a disagreement cannot be overcome—when will parties agree to
disagree. It suggests that even rational parties who are willing to
update their own views in light of the views of others may fail to reach
consensus, if they either have different priors (i.e., biases, prejudices),
or if their private information is not sufficiently well communicated to
trigger the inference process.
When an “agreement to disagree” results from different priors—
different initial beliefs on what is going to happen—there is little
reason to expect that the parties would eventually be able to resolve
their differences. If parties attribute the gap in their positions, not to
private information but to a preference-based divergence, they would
not reach consensus. If, say, a buyer and a seller negotiating the sale of
a firm have different probability assessments concerning the future
profitability of the firm, such that are not based on private information
but rather on psychological factors, prejudices, or tastes, agreement
may permanently elude them.
On the other hand, an “agreement to disagree” may also occur even
when parties are not influenced by such biases, but instead have a
difficulty in credibly communicating each other’s views and
information. Take the buyer of the firm who is potentially ready to
infer that the firm is worth more than she thought, once she recognizes
that the seller’s true valuation is high. While the seller’s information
cannot be directly conveyed, his assessments can. As long as the buyer
cannot reliably infer all that the seller knows, disagreement may
persist.
Interestingly, if disagreement arises from the difficulty to
communicate the underlying information between the parties, it may
nevertheless be short lived. Over time—over several “rounds” of
communicating each other’s opinions—the parties would eventually
revise their views, infer each other’s information, and reach

________________________________________________________
25

See also Moriss H. DeGroot, Reaching a Consensus, 69 The Journal of the American
Statistical Association 118 (1974).
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agreement.26 Thus, an “interim” negotiation stage may exhibit an
agreement to disagree, only to be resolved later, as more updating will
take place.
In real life negotiations, this “interim” negotiation stage might be a
long one. Parties may be unable to agree on an issue, but at the same
time recognize that their inability to agree could eventually be
overcome, as more of their private information is credibly shared. It is
this perceived “temporariness” of the disagreement that could manifest
itself in a phased agreement, whereby parties postpone till a later stage
the further resolution of some term of their agreement. Thus, the
economic model of agreeing-to-disagree provides a rationality-based
account for the negotiation practice of postponement of problematic
issues. The next section discusses the prominence of this practice
2. Negotiation Practices
Parties to complex negotiations may deliberately choose to leave
parts of their agreement incomplete. This is done, not as an oversight,
but as a calculated strategy aimed at increasing the chance for success.
To begin with, in complex deals it is technically impossible to tackle
all issues simultaneously. Consensus is achieved piecemeal, as
different aspects of the transaction are brought up. There usually
comes a point in the negotiations in which sufficient issues were
resolved that some commitment between the parties becomes
desirable. The arrival at partial agreement does not represent a
conclusion or a negotiation peak, but rather a necessary stage toward a
more complete agreement. At this stage, parties expect that the
remaining issues would eventually be resolved, through a process of
continued piecemeal negotiations.
Other reasons why the aspects of the transaction cannot be
resolved all at once have to do with the varying degrees of difficulty in
agreeing over different issues. The parties may believe that the
difficulty in overcoming disagreement over these issues may subside
after most of the agreement is determined, or that future negotiations
may succeed where present negotiations failed (if, say, some new
information comes along). They may also postpone some sticky issues
in the hope that might be able to sidestep them (say, when a relevant
contingency does not materialize.)
________________________________________________________
26

For a model in which agents need several rounds to revise their opinions and to reach
consensus, see John D. Geanakoplos and Heraklis M. Polemarchakis, We Can’t Disagree
Forever, 28 J. Econ. Theory 192 (1982).
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In any event, when parties leave their agreement deliberately
incomplete, they are making a commitment to be bound to the agreed
upon terms, conditional on the remaining terms being resolved in a
manner satisfactory to them. While this is not a commitment to the full
blown contract that was not yet finalized, it is a commitment to the
relationship and to refraining from unilateral departure. Specifically, it
is commonly recogniz ed in negotiation manuals that contentious issues
should be avoided in initial stages of the negotiation as they might
“place an unbearable strain on overall settlement process”. 27 Parties
are encouraged to tackle easier issues first, reach as much consensus as
possible, thereby increasing their own motivation and incentive to find
ways to resolve the contentious issues. Or, each may believe that by
delaying consensus a future resolution that is more favorable to her
would become more likely. 28 The effort already spent on achieving
partial agreement, the dynamic of good will that this effort generated,
as well as the shaping up of the potential surplus from a complete
agreement, may accord a more amenable context for the resolution of
the remaining, stalemated, issues.29
This phasing strategy, it should be noted, is different than the
negotiation strategy of resorting to a third party neutral’s arbitrational
authority. The latter strategy, by removing the veto power each party
has, exposes them to greater risk. It is appropriate for parties who are
willing to accept a compromise, but have conflicting views on what
consists a fair compromise. In the situations discussed above, parties
are not yet ready to commit to a compromise, and prefer to maintain
their veto power over a non-consensual resolution. In these situations,
a rational phasing of the agreement process is believed to increase
their chances of success. Indeed, parties often elect non-binding forms
of mediation, further evidence to the prevalence of the ir desire to
maintain the veto power over any compromise, however reasonable.
At the interim stage, after some of the less contentious issues were
resolved, do the parties regard themselves under commitment? Surely,
the parties do not consider there to be a full-blown enforceable

________________________________________________________
27

David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator 97 (1986) (parties should
avoid, or altogether remove, contentious issues that “may render agreement impossible”).

28

See, e.g., David A. Lax and James K. Sebenius, The Manager as Negotiator 96-97 (Free Press
1986) (“Negotiations often leave much ambiguity with the tacit understanding that a definite
resolution of the issue perhaps strongly favoring one party will later become necessary”)
29
Id., at 222; Robert Mnookin, Scott R. Peppet, and Andrew STulumello, Beyond Winning:
Negotiating to Create Value in Deals and Disputes 251 (2000).
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agreement.30 On the other hand, a complete freedom to walk away also
conflicts with the dynamics of the negotiation. It would indicate that
even the resolved issues can be reopened and would thus diminish the
value of such initial agreement. Since it is this value that generates
further agreement, a norm of unrestricted freedom to retract would be
detrimental to the successful resolution of a negotiation that has
already reached a serious stage.
[Talk here about no-retraction norms in the markets]
The recognition that parties might prefer to leave parts of their
agreement deliberately incomplete due to the fear that otherwise the
deal might fall through is commonly mentioned in contracts treatises. 31
It has also been developed independently in a recent article by Robert
Scott.32 According to Scott, indefiniteness is often a deliberate drafting
choice of the parties, who “appear to prefer the indefinite agreement
they concluded to the more explicit and verifiable alternative that they
ignored”. 33 Scott’s particular account suggests that deliberate gaps are
left in the agreement to make room for subsequent informal
agreement, which in turn is driven by reciprocal fairness. That is, Scott
suggests that deliberately incomplete agreements should be legally
unenforceable, to enable the parties to utilize informal methods of selfenforcement, particularly voluntary performance through reciprocity.
While Scott’s explanation for the existence of indefinite
agreements and of agreements-to-agree is different than the one
offered in this Article, it shares the fundamental observation of the
existence of deliberately incomplete agreements. Scott too observes
that one of the strategies available to parties negotiating an agreement
is to leave some terms unresolved, in the expectation that their
resolution will become possible in the future course of their
relationship, and in the expectation that the law will not fill the gaps
with a mid -range compromise. But while Scott argues that there
should be no legal sanction on a party who retracts from such an
agreement, to leave room for informal negotiations the account
developed in this Article focuses on settings in which such informal
negotiations failed. Let me turn now to explain what parties might gain
________________________________________________________
30

31
32
33

Lax and Sebenius, supra note 27, at 279-280 (Emphasizing the informal sanctions of breaking
contingent agreements); Roy J. Lewicki, et al., Negotiations 100 (2d Ed. 1994) (Advocating
that negotiators strategically make only tentative commitments until an entire agreement is
reached).
E. Alan Farnsworth, Contracts 208 (3d Ed. 1999)
Scott, supra note 11.
Id., at 19
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from a regime that assigns some legal consequences to their
deliberately indefinite agreement.
3. The Benefits of Gradual Commitment
The argument thus far suggest that agreements to disagree are both
conceptually possible and practically prevalent, but it has yet to
explore the reasons why such intermediate forms of commitment
should not be freely retractable. Shouldn’t the parties be free to walk
away anytime prior to full agreement? In thinking about what
negotiating parties gain from constraining their mutual ability to walk
away even before full agreement is reached, there are various sources
of value that might be recognized. One type of benefit, often
mentioned in the negotiation literature referenced above, has to do
with “psychological” and cognitive effects that are associated with a
gradual compromise. Concessions that may be hard to make if framed
as a lumpy, measurable departure from the ideal terms, may be easier
to digest in consecutive small portions.34 Here, the value of entering
into partial commitments in the intermediate stage is the fragmentation
of the otherwise hard-to-swallow large commitment. Is this not the
major reason why increasingly growing pre-marital commitments are a
common feature preceding the full-blown marriage? And why, the
more advanced the pre-marital commitment is, the more costly it is, in
terms of informal sanctions, to retract? Thus, if parties were free to
walk away anytime prior to a full formal agreement, the benefits of a
gradual progression of the commitment would be lost.
Another benefit arising from the existence of an interim
commitment at the precontractual stage has to do with the “integrity”
of the negotiation process. It is increasingly recognized by legal
writers that when the risk of parties walking away is diminished, the
“ritual” of contract negotiation is taken more seriously. Parties are
more likely to enter the bargaining only when they are ready to do
business, they would refrain from making misleading gestures, and
greater trust is likely to emerge. 35 Put differently, the signal that an
entrance into negotiations transmits with respect to the propensity of a

________________________________________________________
34

See, e.g., Robert C. Cialdini, Influence 27 (1984) (“The trick is to bring up the extra
[expenses] independently of one another so that each small price will seem petty when
compared to the already-determined much larger one.”)
35
See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 15; Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133
N.W.2d 267 (1965).
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party to work towards a deal is more powerful the greater is the
sanction for walking away. 36
Why is some form of interim commitment useful for the parties?
In fact, we might worry that the opposite is true, namely, that any form
of costly precontractual commitment—any limitation of the freedom
from contract—might cause parties to think twice before entering the
negotiations. Such precontractual commitments, if backed up by legal
liability, might “chill” the incentives to bargain, reducing the incidence
of surplus creating negotiations, and thus reducing, rather than
enhancing, the parties’ payoffs. 37
One explanation for the value-enhancing effect of precontractual
liability, which was developed in recent economic literature, focuses
on the incentives to invest in the relationship. 38 In the same manner
that contractual liability is instrumental in promoting reliance on the
contractual promise, precontractual liability can be instrumental in
promoting reliance on the partial, precontractual commitment. Such
precontractual reliance on negotiations can take many forms. It may
involve the forgoing of opportunities to negotiate with other partners; 39
loss of job offers and promotions; 40 training and investment in
relationship-specific assets;41 acquisition or sharing of information;
investment in the real estate by a potential tenant; 42 and many more.
These are costly activities that parties undertake in order to increase
the size of the “pie” that any agreement would subsequently divide.
________________________________________________________
36

37

This “signaling” effect is recognized in the international negotiations literature. See, e.g.,
Lloyd Jensen, Soviet-American Behavior in Disarmament Negotiations, in I.W. Zartman (ed.),
T HE 50% SOLUTION (Anchor Book 1976), at 289.
See 1 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 361 (2d. Ed. 1998) (describing “a chilling effect” of
discouraging parties from entering negotiations); Jason S. Johnston, Communication and
Courtship: Cheap Talk Economics and the Law of Contract Formation, 85 Va. L. Rev. 385,
416-417, 445-446 (1999) (arguing that liability for pre-trade representations in the event of
negotiation breakdown woul d “cause the market to shrink” and would force parties to utilize
more cautious bargaining strategies, wasting opportunities for efficient trade).

38

The argument that liability can enhance precontractual reliance appears in Avery W. Katz,
When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary
Negotiations, 105 Yale L.J. 1249 (1996); Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient
Reliance, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 481 (1996). A formal analysis of the particular rules of liability that
can induce efficient reliance is Lucian A. Bebchuk and Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontractual
Reliance, 30 J. Leg. Stud. 423 (2001).
39
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp.491
(1987).
40
41
42

Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W. 2d. 114 (Minn. 1981).
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
Hammond v. Ringstad, 10 Alaska 543 (1945).
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In the absence of some kind of commitment, parties will apply
greater caution and expend less in precontractual reliance, in the fear
that any such investment might be wasted if the other party walks
away, or in the fear that reliance will make them vulnerable to hold-up
by the other party. That is, the benefits a party can enjoy from any
reliance investment are diminished by the chance that the deal will fall
through or by the ability of the other party to expropriate some of the
surplus created by the investment. Indeed, this is one reason why
parties who enter complex and costly negotiations are careful to first
agree on some precontractual arrangements for cost reimbursement in
the event that negotiations fail.
According to this view, parties enter into partial agreements and
agreements-to-agree in the hope that they would have some binding
force (the precise magnitude of this force will be discussed below), in
order to provide each other some measure of security, thereby
encouraging each other to keep investing in the success of the
relationship. Because it is costly for the other party remain in the
negotiations and to further invest in it, each party must sacrifice some
of her own freedom to walk away in order to encourage the other party
to take the chance. The precontractual commitment enables a party to
make a commitment to a specific partner without making a
commitment to the full set of specific terms of the deal. In the presence
of such a commitment, the risk each party faces, of her counterpart
unilaterally abandoning the relationship, is diminished. With this
added confidence greater mutual relationship -specific investment
emerges. And with the greater mutual investment, a subsequent fullblown contract is both more likely and more profitable.
Another way to think about the value of a partially binding
agreement to agree is to recognize the “self-fulfilling prophecy” that it
embodies. When parties are faced with issues that are difficult to
resolve, the memorialization of a precontractual agreement over the
resolved issues and an agreement to agree over the unresolved
issues—if coupled with some liability for breakdown—makes it more
likely that the parties will eventually succeed to agree over the
unresolved issues. The notion, prevalent among contract law scholars,
that an agreement to agree is a “contradiction in terms”43 and that a
‘contract to make a contract’ is conceptually impossible, overlooks this
self-fulfilling effect. A contract-to-make-a-contract, if it is associated
with some (albeit less than full contractual) liability, can make the
subsequent contract more likely.
________________________________________________________
43

Ridgway v. Wharton, 6 H.L.Cas. 268; Corbin, supra note 12, at 134.
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B. The Inadequacy of Standard Gap-Fillers
Having argued that contractual gaps can arise from tra nsactors’
deliberate choice to phase the agreement process, the next step of the
argument is to demonstrate that standard approaches to gap filling are
ill equipped to address the needs and concerns that give rise to such
deliberate gaps. Standard gap filling techniques, we saw, provide a
single definitive provision, which the parties are assumed to anticipate.
Thus, when the parties take into account the legally supplied default
term, they cannot effectively leave portions of their deal unresolved,
for future negotiation and agreement. Whether it is the express
agreement or the background default rules that define the totality of
obligations, they are fully determined: the set of legal obligations
cannot remain both binding and obligationally incomplete. No further
stipulation of terms by the parties is required. 44
For example, if, in the absence of an explicit agreement over price
the law supplements the contract with a definitive term, either the
“reasonable” (majoritarian) price, or a contra proferentem (penalty)
price provision, the parties would recognize the default price provision
and would consider the deal to be obligationally complete. 45
Contracting in the shadow of this definitive default term is equivalent
to explicitly drafting this term into the contract. Any desire that the
parties might have had to reach a binding commitment and leave the
price term temporarily open, for future affirmative resolution, rather
than a court-imposed compromise, would be frustrated.
Put differently, once it is recognized that the gap in the agreement
is due neither to drafting costs nor to one -sided superior information,
there is no prima facie reason to expect that either a mimicking or a
penalty default provision would be desirable. In fact, in many cases in
which parties deliberately leave a term open, long and costly
negotiations preceded. In these cases parties often search for ways to
explicitly state the incompleteness of their agreement, which—from a
drafting perspective—is probably more costly than drafting a
definitive “reasonable” provision. That is, the saving of drafting cost—
________________________________________________________
44

45

The law recognizes interim forms of agreement, under which the obligations are not fully
determined but the parties are required to negotiate them in good faith. See Teachers Insurance
and Annuity Association of America v. Tribune Co .,670 F. Supp.491 (1987). Here, however,
the incomplete agreement is wholly unenforceable; A breach of the good faith duty usually
does not give rise to contract damages.
True, the parties would have to be able to anticipate what price the court would supplement,
but their ability to do so is the foundation of standard default rule theories. Without it, parties
cannot be assumed to opt out of non-mimicking defaults, or cannot be incentivized to reveal
private information in opting out of penalty defaults.

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art2

22

Ben-Shahar:

AGREEING TO DISAGREE

21

the rationale of the mimic -the parties’ will theory—cannot explain the
gap. Similarly, the failure of the parties to agree on a term is not
necessarily due to one party’s superior information. True, nonagreement may arise as a result of, say, each party safely hiding his or
her private information or reservation value, and had these values been
revealed, an agreement would be easier to reach. However, this is not
the type of one -sided information that the law is necessarily interested
in forcing out of the parties by means of a penalty default. Thus, in
these deliberate incompleteness cases, the underlying justifications for
standard gap filling techniques are not valid.
C. The Inadequacy of the No-Enforcement Approach
When a contract is recognized to be deliberately incomplete, it
may be conjectured that the correct legal response is to refrain
altogether from filling the gap, not because of indefiniteness, but due
to absence of assent. After all, each party had a different term in mind,
and they manifested a preference to have an incomplete set of
obligations and to postpone till a later date further agreement. Since
contract enforcement requires an objective manifestation of meetingof-the-minds, here we have an indication of the opposite, of an
absence of consent. If the court were to supplement the parties’
agreement with a definitive term, the contract would be complete,
contrary to the parties’ intention.
The problem with this no-supplementation regime is that, under
current contract law doctrine, it implies non-enforcement of the
entire—albeit partial—agreement reached by the parties. 46 If the court
does not supply a definitive term, it is impossible to determine the
plaintiff’s expectation interest, and thus the remaining solution is to
deem the contract too indefinite to be enforced. To illustrate, consider
again the missing price example. If the parties left the price
intentionally undetermined, and if one of the parties tries to enforce the
deal from which the other party is now completely backing off, the
choice not to supply a price term leaves the court little choice but to
consider the whole deal unenforceable. Since the deal cannot be
carried out without setting a price, nor can damages based on lost
profit be calculated to make the enforcing party whole, the contract

________________________________________________________
46

See Drees Farming Ass’n v. Thompson, 264 N.W. 2d 883 (N.D., 1976) (no-supplementation
of an option of renewal under “terms to be negotiated” would make the option meaningless).
Farnsworth, supra note 31, at 213-4.
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fails for indefiniteness. The missing term is deemed essential,
rendering the remaining terms unenforceable.47
One way to defend the no-supplementation approach is by
recognizing that parties often prefer their agreement to be governed by
norms other than legal sanctions.48 Parties expect either their
reputational concerns or norms of fairness and reciprocity to provide
both the missing content of the agreement as well as the inducement to
abide by it. By not supplementing these partial agreements, courts
leave room for parties to invoke such informal mechanisms of consent,
catering to the parties’ preference for fairness-guided exchange.
Supplementation, then, even if sought by one party ex-post, is in
conflict with the parties’ initial intent to rely on extra-legal sources of
obligation.
While this approach recognizes and relies on the ability (and
desire) of the parties to resolve the indefinite portions of their deal
informally, it does not conflict with legal intervention in those cases in
which the parties failed to resolve their differences. Further, the
premise that the parties may want the court not to interfere with the
resolution of the remaining issues does not imply that the parties also
consider the formally drafted portions of the agreement non-binding.
While the agreement is incomplete, it does contain some elements of
consent, which the parties chose to draft into a legally binding format.
Making the agreement wholly unenforceable even when the norms of
reciprocity failed to provide resolution and allowing the parties to
freely walk away would frustrate this accomplishment. If, instead, the
court were to enforce only the memorialized parts of the agreement,
and non-intervene in the unresolved parts, extra-legal relations could
continue to maintain their role in providing the missing terms.
***
It might seem, then, that presented with a deliberately incomplete
contract, the court’s adjudicative choices include either “aggressive”
supplementation of terms with definitive default provision or nonenforcement of the contract entirely. That is, the court is faced with an
all-or-nothing choice. Supplement the gaps and enforce the partial,
incomplete, deal as if it were complete (“all”), or consider it a
preliminary, non-binding deal (“nothing”). In particular, this
________________________________________________________
47
48

See, e.g., Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417 N.E. 2d 541 (N.Y., 1981);
Corbin, supra note 12 § 4.1, at 532.
See Scott, supra note 11.

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art2

24

Ben-Shahar:

AGREEING TO DISAGREE

23

dichotomy suggests that the court cannot apply a partial enforcement
approach, and enforce only the agreed upon terms.
In the next section, I will argue that this all-or-nothing feature,
although it fairly describes many areas of the law, is not optimal and
not necessary. When the parties affirmatively choose to leave a matter
open for further negotiation and yet manifest an intent to be bound to
the resolved issues, a legal regime different than the standard gapfilling approach is called for. The choice courts face should not be
restricted to no-enforcement versus aggressive gap filling. In these
situations, an intermediate regime is available, which supplements and
enforces such deliberately incomplete deals without writing the
missing elements of the contract over for the parties.
III. B IASED SUPPLEMENTATION
A. Decoupling the Default Rule

Consider a situation in which parties negotiate a contested issue
(say, a contingent price), with each insisting on a term that is favorable
to her. If the parties reach a deadlock over this issue, yet proceed to
draft an agreement on the remaining issues, each party can be deemed
to manifest consent to a complete contract which contains the agreed
upon terms and the term she demanded concerning the stalemated
issue. That is, assent by a party to the incomplete agreement that
contains a “to-be-agreed-upon” gap eliminates any reasonable grounds
she might have to reject the complete agreement when supplemented
by the term she has been openly seeking all along. This manifested
consent is, of course, “constructive”. There is actual assent only to the
part of the deal that includes the expressly agreed upon terms; but
there is constructive, or inferred, intent to be bound to the part of the
deal that was contested, as long as it is resolved with the term that this
party vied for.
Accordingly, in this situation where a contested issue is left
deliberately open, each party can be seen as manifesting assent to a
different deal. It is as if they drafted two contracts, identical in the
components that contain all the agreed-upon issues, but different in the
components that contain the contested issues. Each party is ma king a
commitment to be bound to the contract that contains her favorable
terms. Thus, if one of these hypothetical contracts were to be enforced
against a party, it can only be the one to which she assented, the one
containing her favorable terms.
This interpretation of the deliberately incomplete agreement is
consistent with the parties’ choice to address their differences by
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entering into a partial understanding, rather than remaining silent or
walking away. If the parties recognize their deadlock and nevertheless
draft a partial agreement, they are indicating that some assent has been
obtained. They are also indicating, however, that each is seeking a
different content to the remaining commitment. Accordingly, the only
way to give efficacy to their intent is to decouple the remaining
commitment.
How could that be done? Of course, neither party can enforce a
contract containing her own favorable terms. To these terms, the other
party never surrendered. Instead, the power that each party would have
is to enforce upon her opponent a deal that, with respect to the
contested issues, includes the opponent’s favored terms. (A party can,
of course, choose not exercise this option, in which case—if the other
party does not exercise her own option—the “no contract” outcome
remains.) If the incomplete contract is supplemented in such a manner,
the enforced-against party—being granted the terms she either agreed
to or unilaterally sought—cannot legitimately claim that she never
intended to be bound to it. Isn’t this the deal she pursued all along?
Liability here is grounded, if not on what a party affirmatively
assented to, then at least on a reasonable restriction over what a party
may reasonable reject. 49 If she refuses to deal under such terms, she is
effectively retracting from her previous manifestation of intent.
This gap-filling approach transforms the incomplete contract into a
set of two complete contracts. Essentially, the gap-filler is
“decoupled”: it equals the term favored by the party against whom
enforcement is sought. If, say, the seller demanded a price none less
than $1000 and the buyer was willing to pay no more than $800, and if
every other term of the transaction was agreed upon, the seller can
enforce a deal supplemented by the buyer’s price of $800, whereas the
buyer can enforce a deal supplemented by the seller’s price of $1000.
Hence, each party receives an option to enforce a deal containing the
term the other requested. The precontractual agreement is transformed
into a “double option”. 50
Thus, unlike standard gap-filling approaches, which trace a single
definitive term that best supplements the deal, and apply this term
________________________________________________________
49

50

For the moral basis of this principle of obligation, resting on the non-rejectability of an
individual’s own representations, see Thomas Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in
Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (19?)
See Daniel Friedman and Nili Cohen, 1 Contracts 289 (in Hebrew) (mentioning the technique
of double option and arguing that “a substitute to no supplementation can be found in the
willingness of the plaintiff to acquiesce to the other party’s maximal demand with respect to
the missing element.”)
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regardless of the identity of the party seeking enforcement, this
approach provides a pair of gap fillers. Standard gap-filling
techniques, such as the majoritarian mimicking approach, would
supplement the missing price term in the example above with one that
is “reasonable”. Generally, this term would differ from either $800 or
$1000, and would lie somewhere in the mid range. Such a term,
however, would force on the parties a compromise to which they did
not assent (and perhaps affirmatively rejected.) Under the proposed
approach, the terms of the enforced contract would be such that the
defendant would have no reasonable grounds to claim that an
undesired contract is being imposed on her.
Note, that filling the gap in a manner favorable to the defendant
does not force the plaintiff to transact under terms to which she does
not assent. The pro-defendant terms are enforced only if the plaintiff
so chooses, preferring such a deal to the no-contract alternative.
Essentially, the question I am addressing is not whether a party will
want to enforce a contract supplemented in a way so favorable to the
other (she often may not), but whether the other party should be
entitled to reject such self-favorable deal.
B. “Most Favorable” to the Defendant
In choosing as a default the term that is favorable to the enforcedagainst party, the example above identified this term by reference to
the par ty’s express proposal. It was assumed that the parties exchanged
explicit communications, each stating her favored term, and failed to
strike a compromise. Consequently, to complete the deal, each party
was given an option to incorporate the term proposed by the other. In
that example, the content of the gap filler—the term that is known to
be desired by the enforced-against party—was not hypothetical, but
rather evidenced by reference to her own affirmative representations.
In general, however, parties may leave a contract deliberately
incomplete without first going through the motions of making explicit
proposals and without marking their respective favorable terms. For
example, the parties to a lease contract may agree on a renewal period,
but leave the renewal price indefinite, “to be agreed upon”, in the
expectation that it might be easier for them to reach assent at a later
stage. In these situations, there is no affirmative statement by any party
from which an inference can be drawn as to her favorable term. How
would the decoupled gap filler operate in this more general setting?
Supplementing the deal with the term the enforced-against party
proposed was defended above on the grounds that it assured that this
party is not being subjected to a transaction with terms she had not
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intended. The existence of an affirmative proposal provided a strong
basis for inferring the “constructive”, if not the actual, assent of this
party. It made the task of identifying the content of the non-rejectable
terms straightforward. In the absence of an express proposal, a similar
principle of assent can be satisfied if the gap is supplemented by terms
that fulfill the same non-rejectability standard—terms that are most
favorable (within the set of reasonable terms) to the defendant. While
this party never expressly stated what these most favorable terms are,
the court would have to imagine what is the most that this party
reasonably hoped to gain when entering into the incomplete agreement
and how this party hoped, ex ante, to resolve the missing provisions.
Instead of using a majoritarian or an “average” term, the court would
apply a biased term, favorable to the defendant.
Thus, the only difference between situations in which the
defendant made a proposal versus situations in which he did not is the
difficulty of ascertaining what are the defendant’s most favorable
terms. There are reasons to believe, however, that the judicial task of
identifying these pro-defendant gap fillers is practical, and no more
difficult than identifying reasonable gap fillers. For one, the nature of
adversarial proceedings is already such that each party provides
evidence favorable to herself. For example, in adjudicating a missing
price, the defendant-seller will likely bring expert testimony
supporting a price in the higher end of the reasonable spectrum. In
fact, it would be easier to apply a pro-defendant gap-filler than to try
and figure out from the parties’ polarized evidence the proper balance
that would adequately reflect majoritarian terms. Further, courts can
instruct defendants to designate the term that they favor, and induce
defendants’ compliance by threatening that if the designation is
unreasonable, the court would supply a term. 51
To illustrate, consider the celebrated case of Walker v. Keith, the
Kentucky decision that ruled agreements to agree unenforceable. 52
Parties entered into a 10-year lease of $100 per month with an option
to extend that lease for an additional 10-year term at a rental “to be
agreed upon”. Holding that the parties’ minds have never met on a
criterion to determine the rent, the court refused to fill the gap or to
enforce the extension of the lease. 53 At the trial, however, each party
________________________________________________________
51
52
53

See, e.g., Ontario Downs v. Lauppe, 192 Cal.App.2d 697, 13 Cal.Rptr. 782 (1961).
382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1964).
A minority of courts have decided, in identical circumstances, to protect the lessee’s reliance
and to fill in a rental term and enforce the agreement. See, e.g., Fuller v. Michigan National
Bank, 68 N.W. 2d 771 (Mich. 1955); F ARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 218 (3d. Ed. 1999). The
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explicitly stated what his favorable term is. The lessor demanded a
price reflecting the relatively high increase in rent locally. The lessee
sought to prove price changes nationally, thereby enjoy the lowest
plausible rent adjustment. 54 Since both demands were within reason,
the court could have given the lessee the option to extend the lease
under the term identified to be favorable to the lessor. At least as a
matter of conceptual logic, the “biased” supplementation is no less—
and arguably better—reflective of the lessor’s incompletely manifested
intent than the result of no renewal.
In fact, the logic underlying this decoupled supplementation
approach is already recognized and applied in contract doctrine. The
Restatement, for example, recognizes that when an agreement is
indefinite, it may be possible to provide one remedy but not another. 55
It may also be possible to grant a remedy only to one party, not
another. For example, when payment terms are not specified in the
sale agreement, “the contract is too indefinite to support a decree of
specific performance against [the buyer], but [the buyer] may obtain
such a decree if he offers to pay the full price in cash”. 56 Since it is
possible to identify a gap-filler that is most favorable to the seller, the
contract can be enforced only against the seller.
This is not to say that the problem of identifying a party’s most
favorable terms is trivial. Even if the defendant made express
proposals at some point in the negotiations, these prior proposals may
have become stale, no longer representing the best the defendant can
hope for. New information, changed market conditions, subsequent
concessions the defendant made, might all render the defendant’s
earlier proposal less favorable to her. In those cases, the defendant’s
most favorable terms should be inferred, not from her proposal, but
from the relevant circumstances. Any factor that materialized prior to
the time designated by the parties for resolution of the open issue is
relevant for ascertaining the defendant’s most favorable terms, with
the exclusion of the plaintiff’s reliance investment. As explained in
section III.D below, the defendant must be precluded from extracting
the value generated by the plaintiff’s precontractual investment.
This generous pro-defendant supplementation guarantees that the
deal to be enforced is no worse than what the defendant could have
Code also “rejects in these instances the formula that ‘an agreement to agree is
unenforceable”. See UCC 2-305 cmt. 1.
54
55
56

382 S.W.2d at 203.
Restatement § 33(2), cmt b (“uncertainty may preclude one remedy without affecting
another”.)
Id., Ill. 2.
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intended when she entered the incomplete agreement. It is the only
deal to which it can confidently be said that the defendant manifested
her “constructive” intent to be bound. What reasonable grounds would
the enforced-against party have to reject such a favorable deal? Only
opportunistic motives or a retraction from previous manifested intent
can underlie a refusal to transact under such favorable terms.
Surely, the notion of assent even to “most favorable” terms is a
fiction. It is less of a fiction, however, than the notion of assent to
mimicking defaults. Mimicking default rules—whether tailored or
‘one -size-fits-all’—are based on the premise that a mutual will of the
parties exists. In incomplete contracts, particularly ones in which the
parties have reached a stalemate, the premise that such mutual will
exists is problematic. As the court in Walker v. Keith conceded, “it is
pure fiction to say that the court… is enforcing something the parties
agreed to.” 57 The same logic of loyalty to the parties’ will can
nevertheless be fulfilled by gap-fillers that mimic the will of one party
at a time—the terms this party favored. Indeed, it is recognized that the
hypothetical consent fiction underlying the mimicking theory of
default rules prescribes those obligations that are rational for the
parties. 58 If rationality, not true consent, is the underlying basis for the
ordinarily supplemented obligations, this basis is only reinforced by
the proposed one-sided supplementation approach. Wouldn’t it be
irrational for a party to reject terms most favorable to her?
Thus, in the presence of a deliberately incomplete contract, the
mimic-the-parties’-will default metamorphoses into a decoupled set of
mimic-one-party’s will terms, of which a single one is chosen
according to the identity of the party seeking enforcement. Assent to
this term is no more, and arguably less, fictitious than assent to
standard gap-fillers. There surely is less reason for the enforcedagainst party to reject this term. Or, stated differently, there is every
reason to presume that, when leaving additional terms to be agreed
upon, each party truly intended—and if asked would have confirmed
this intent—to grant the other party the option to enforce the a deal
supplemented by her most favorable terms.
C. Scope
________________________________________________________
57
58

382 S.W.2d at 203..
Jules L. Coleman, Douglas D. Heckathorn, and Steven M. Maser, A Bargaining Theory
Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 Harv. J. L. & Pub.
Pol. 639, 648-9 (1989).
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Pro-defendant gap fillers, whether derived from explicit proposals
the defendant made or from the constructive exercise of inferring the
defendant’s most favorable terms, are likely to prescribe different gapfilling content than mimicking/reasonable terms. As emphasized
throughout the Article, this technique is not a substitute for standard
gap-filling standards, but rather should be viewed as complementary.
It is an appropriate solution to indefiniteness only when the gaps are
left deliberately, with the aim of resolving them within the
relationship. Before turning to doctrinal illustration of the proposed
technique, two additional remarks concerning the conceptual reach of
pro-defendant gap fillers are in order.
The first remark concerns the “size” of the gaps that the proposed
technique can fill. Normally, when using standard majoritarian
defaults, courts are wary not to “write the contract over” for the
parties. That is, supplementation is conducted only when the gaps in
the contract are not too wide. Otherwise, the presumption of
“hypothetical assent” becomes strained. The same caution should
apply to the application of the pro-defendant default terms. True, when
utilizing most favorable terms, the notion of hypothetical one -sided
assent can plausibly be stretched. A party may be deemed to assent to
terms most favorable to her even if the set of agreed upon terms is
small, or even non-existent. However, absent a serious manifestation
by this party that she intends to be bound to some transaction with this
counterpart, it would be dangerous to give the other party an option to
enforce a transaction, even one containing terms that are very
favorable to the enforced-against party. Such an option would
relinquish the freedom from contract and thus undermine the security
of property rights and the autonomy embedded in the voluntariness of
transfers. To avoid this result, gap filling under the proposed theory
can be restricted, as it is under other theories, to instances in which the
express assent (this time, by one party) is sufficiently substantial.
The second remark concerns the nature of assent to most favorable
defaults. It should be pointed out that, by its definition, the concept of
‘assent’ in contract law already embodies a tension between the true
“factual” intent of the parties and legally binding contractual terms.
What constitutes the set of binding consensual terms does not always
conform to what the parties truly intended, discussed, and agreed
upon. Doctrines such as the parol evidence rule, the battle of the
forms, and, more generally, the objective theory of assent, drive a
wedge between consent in-fact and its legal “translation”, mutual
assent. As long as there are good conceptual and instrumental
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justifications for this wedge, it serves a useful purpose.59 Accordingly,
the notion of assent to most favorable default rules, to the extent that it
is fictional, would have to be defended on these bases. The conceptual
basis—the argument that ‘most favorable’ default terms are consistent
with assent in deliberately incomplete contracts—has been developed
thus far. I will now turn to examine the instrumental defense.
D. Increasing the Contractual Surplus
Parties may seek to form partially binding commitments for several
reasons. As argued above, such pre-contractual commitments help
parties “digest” concessions gradually, protect the integrity of the
negotiation arena, and promote investments in the relationship. 60 Does
the particular form of commitment proposed here, in which a
retracting party is bound to terms most favorable to her, suffice in
achieving these goals?
The conceptual analysis above showed that pro-defendant
supplementation of deliberately incomplete contracts is a way to create
contractual liability in gradual manner. The more terms are left to be
agreed upon, the more pro-defendant terms will be utilized as gapfillers, and thus the smaller is the burden of liability to the defendant.
While the complete freedom to walk away is restricted, the practical
“cost” of this restriction is a function of the terms the defendant must
put up with, which, in the case of pro-defendant gap filling, is
somewhere between zero-burden of no-contract and the high burden of
a majoritarian contract.
This intermediate form of liability fragments an otherwise hardto-swallow full contractual commitment into sequential small steps.
When a precontractual agreement is binding but can only be enforced
with terms most favorable to a party, each party knows that by
entering this agreement she is effectively “surrendering” only the
terms that are covered by the partial agreement. While she is not
guaranteed to get the most favorable terms with respect to the
unresolved issues, she is guaranteed that nothing worse than these
terms can be unilaterally enforced against her. That is, any additional
compromise from this “most favorable” benchmark can only be
consensual. The unresolved matters would never be the reason to exit
the relationship. Thus, a party can make incremental concessions,
spared from a moment in which an entire “large” concession is to be
yielded.
________________________________________________________
59
60

See, generally, Farnsworth, supra note 31 at 116-118.
See text in Section II.A.3 supra.
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The guarantee that the other party cannot freely walk away is
valuable in that it diminishes the ability of the other party to engage in
hold-up games. If the other party is threatening to walk away unless
some terms already agreed upon are changed, the threatened party has
some remedy. True, this remedy is not as potent as full-blown
contractual liability would provide, as it only inflicts a partial burden
on the threatening party. Still, this intermediate remedy makes it less
likely that retractions from the precontractual agreement would occur
or that the relationship will completely unravel. And with the greater
security against retraction and in the longevity of the relationship, any
investment made in enhancing the value of the relationship is more
likely to bear fruit. Thus, each party will have an increased incentive to
invest in the relationship and rely on the precontractual
understandings.61
Stated differently, we saw that under the proposed gap-filling
regime the deliberately incomplete contract is decoupled in accordance
with the identity of the enforced-against party. From the perspective of
party A, there are two enforceable contracts, each addressing a
different concern this party might have (the same applies for party B.)
The first contract is the one that can be enforced against party A. The
fact that this contract includes gap fillers that are so favorable to her
guarantees that no additional concessions beyond those already made
would be forced on her. This gives her the peace of mind to make
partial concessions, one step at a time. The second contract is the one
that this party can enforce against party B, if the anticipated further
negotiations are abandoned. The fact that party A has this power to
enforce a contract on the other party is sufficient in providing her with
the needed assurance against opportunistic hold-up by Party B. While
party A might prefer to negotiate the remaining terms and not yield
right away to those most favorable to party B, she at least has the
option to preclude party B from abandoning the relied-upon
relationship.

________________________________________________________
61

See Bebchuk and Ben- Shahar, supra note 38, at 443-9, for a formal proof that incentives to
invest under this regime will be optimal. As the formal proof shows, for the plaintiff to have
optimal incentives to invest, the defendant must be precluded from extracting any value that
arises from this investment. This is also why the definition of the defendant’s most favorable
terms must exclude value that came about as a result of the plaintiff’s precontractual reliance
investment.
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IV. D OCTRINAL APPLICATIONS
The analysis thus far studied the desirable properties of a regime
that supplements indefinite agreements with terms that are favorable to
the defendant. Such a regime was shown to create an intermediate
level of liability, deviating from the traditional all-or-nothing approach
of the mutual assent doctrine, and one that reflects more accurately the
intent of parties who deliberately left an agreement incomplete. This
Section turns to examine with more detail whether and how the
proposed regime is already part of, or can be infused into, the law of
indefinite agreements. It shows, first, that the seeds of the proposed
gap-filling regime are already planted in contract doctrine. That is,
courts and commentators recognize both the technique of filling gaps
with terms most favorable to the defendant, and the rationale
underlying this technique, although they do so without embracing the
full implications and the generality of this approach. Second, the
analysis shows that other existing doctrines and practices, which are
traditionally viewed as part of the all-or-nothing approach, can
nevertheless provide the infrastructure for expanding the domain of the
proposed gap-filling regime. I will argue that when contracts are left
deliberately incomplete with the intent to be further negotiated, such
expansion of the doctrine is desirable.
A. Cure By Concession
Supplementing incomplete contracts by terms most favorable to
the defendant is a technique already recognized in contract law
doctrine. Under the doctrine of ‘cure by concession’, when the contract
is silent over a material term, the indefiniteness is overcome precisely
in the manner describe above, that is, by granting the plaintiff the
option to concede the missing term in accordance with in the
defendant’s most favorable arrangement. 62 As Corbin recognizes,
“[w]here the parties intend to contract but defer agreement on certain
essential terms until later, the gap can be cured if one of the parties
offers to accept any reasonable proposal that the other may make.”63
Cure by concession is often applied in cases in which the parties
agreed on a pric e but left the payment terms “to be agreed upon”. In
these situations, if the buyer agrees to make a full payment in cash and
with no delay, namely, in a manner most favorable to the seller, the
________________________________________________________
62
63

See Farnsworth supra note 31, at 219.
Corbin, supra note 12, §4.1, at 532.
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indefiniteness is cured. 64 It is not that courts perceive the full payment
in cash as the reasonable term that the parties hypothetically intended,
or would have agreed upon had they continued to negotiate. In fact,
oftentimes it is quite clear that the parties hoped to agree on
installment or credit terms, namely, something less favorable to the
defendant/seller. Rather, courts regard the buyer’s willingness to make
full payment in cash as a waiver that “obviates any need to come to
any agreement as to the manner and form of payment”. 65 Since “there
is no longer any way that the provision may be construed to [the
defendant’s] detriment”, any resistance to the contract on the ground
that it is ambiguous should be eliminated. 66
Cure by concession can also apply to issues more central to the
agreement than payment terms, such as identification of the subjectmatter of the contract, or the price. In Ontario Downs v. Lauppe,67
mentioned above in the Introduction, the parties entered agreement for
the sale of 16 acres of land for $50,000, but did not specify where,
within the seller’s 450-acre lot, does the 16-acre tract lie. The buyer
offered to accept any 16-acre tract that the seller might designate, but
the seller refused. The court held that the parties viewed the
agreement-to-agree as binding, and that the gap should fille d in a way
favorable to the seller. Not knowing which 16-acre tract would satisfy
this criterion, the court instructed that if the buyer waived his right of
selection and was willing to accept any parcel, the seller would be
required to designate an “appropriate parcel”, which the buyer would
then have to accept. If the seller fails to make such a selection, the
buyer would then be entitled to designate a parcel himself. Under this
scheme, the buyer can in effect force the seller to supplement the
contract with a term most favorable to the seller, and the information
as to what term is most favorable to the seller is extracted out of the
________________________________________________________
64

65

66

67

Restatement §33, lll. 2 (“A agrees to sell and B to buy a specific tract of land for $10,000 […]
and to lend B the amount, but the term of the loan are not stated […]. The contract is too
indefinite to [enforce] against B, but B may [enforce it] if he offer to pay the full price in
cash”.)
Shull v. Sexton, 390 P.2d 313 (Col. 1964); Morris v. Ballard, 16 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (if
terms of payment wer e not agreed upon, the purchaser can enforce the deal if he is ready to
pay the agreed price under such terms as the vendor might impose.); Matlack v. Arend, 63
A.2d 812 (N.J ) (if the buyer “waives all credit and offers to pay cash, the defense that the
agreement is too indefinite is untenable”.)
Busching v. Griffin, 542 So.2d 860, 864 (Miss. 1989). But many courts reject this view and
hold agreements that leaves the terms of payment to be agreed upon fatally defective. See
Roberts v. Adams, 330 P.2d 900 (Cal.1958); Corbin, supra note 12, at 579.
192 Cal.App.2d 697, 13 Cal.Rptr. 782 (1961)
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seller by the threat that if he fails to designate it appropriately, he will
have to accept a less favorable, court-designated term. 68
Another illustration of pro-defendant gap fillers in practice
involves contracts that leave the duration of the renewal indefinite. For
example, parties who use standard form leases that provide an
extension clause “for ____ years” occasionally fail to fill in the blank.
This might not be a deliberate case of incompleteness but rather a
result of neglect or haste. Nevertheless, courts facing such
indefiniteness have generally construed these terms “to be for the
shortest period for which the lease could be renewed or extended”. 69
This, as one court explains, guarantees that the landlord will not be
held to a longer period than the agreement stated. 70
When parties leave the price term to be agreed upon later, the
option to cure the indefiniteness by conceding the other party’s most
favorable price is less commonly recognized. Usually, the court would
fill in a price term only if the parties explicitly provided a
“methodology” for determining it, but would hold the agreement
fatally defective otherwise. 71 Alternatively, even in the absence of any
explicit methodology, courts occasionally would fill in the blank with
a fair and reasonable market term. 72 At time, however, a plaintiff who
prefers a contract with the conceded price to the no-contract outcome
would offer to make such a concession and to accept a pro-defendant
gap filler. In his landmark decision in Sun Printing, Cardozo makes
reference to such a technique:
“If price and nothing more had been left open for
adjustment, there might be force in the contention that the
buyer would be viewed, in the light of later provisions, as
the holder of an option. …[The buyer] would have the
privilege of calling for delivery in accordance with a price
established as a maximum.”73

________________________________________________________
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id., at 787.
49 Am. Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 158. Similarly, a general covenant to renew without
stating the number of renewals is construed to entitle the tenant one renewal.
Starr v. Holck, 28 N.W.2d 289 (Mich. 1947).
Joseph Martin Delicatessen v. Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y.1981) (a methodology for
determining the price has to be found within the four corners of the agreement.)
See Validity and Enforceability of Provision for Renewal of Lease at Rental to Be Fixed By
Subsequent Agreement of the Parties, 58 A.L.R.3d 500 (1974)
Sun Printing v. Remington Article & Power, 139 NE 470 (N.Y.1923)..
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Cardozo, however, rejects the application of this approach in his
decision. 74 But there are circumstances in which even a price term can
be supplemented by picking a value most favorable to the defendant.
The following section explores these circumstances.
B. Agreements with an Explicit Range of Terms
Oftentimes, the parties—while failing to specify a definite term
such as price—do specify a range from which they expect to pick out
a definite term in the course of subsequent negotiations. This situation
presents courts with an “intermedia te” form of indefiniteness. There is
no formula or methodology that can yield a certain “resolution of
ambiguity”, but there is more than “an inkling that either of the parties
assented” to some figure. 75 Since courts are reluctant to split the
difference and name a price in the mid -range, the better result—more
loyal to the parties’ agreement—is sometimes achieved by granting
each party an option to concede the other party’s most favorable price
within the range. As Corbin explains the law in this situation,
“The exact price may be left for future negotiation with a
specified maximum and a specified minimum. In such a
case it may be intended that the buyer shall have a binding
option to buy at the maximum, or the seller shall one to sell
at the stated minimum, or both may have such options.”76
Thus, when the parties explicitly state that the price to be agreed
upon “shall not exceed p”, courts have overcome the problem of
indefiniteness by granting the buyer an option to buy at the stated
maximum, p.77 The explicit rationale for this solution is similar to the
one invoked in this article. Namely, a seller’s agreement to agree on a
price not exceeding p can be view as containing two separate
components: (i) continue good faith negotiations over a the price; and
________________________________________________________
74

75
76
77

Commentators raise doubts as to the validity of the outcome in Sun Printing, based on the
same logic developed in this article. See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 31, at 220 (“On the
court’s own reasoning, had the buyer offered to pay the supplier’s highest price […] there
would appear no reason to refuse to enforce the agreement.”) However, many other examples
in line with Sun Printing can be found in adjudication of incomplete lease contracts, where
parties leave the rent to be agreed upon later, and the plaintiff is seeking enforcement under
the best possible terms for the defendant. For a survey of this line of cases, see Knapp, supra
note 15, at 698-703.
Martin Delicatessen, 417 N.E.2d, at __.
Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 138-9 (Rev. Ed. 1993).
See, e.g., Denny v. Jacobson, 55 N.W.2d 568 (Ia. 1952)(Option to renew at price to be agreed
upon “not less than $47.50 or more than $77.50” is enforceable at the maximum rent);
Westminster Transmission v. Czik, 2003 WL 1963271 (Cal.App. 4 Dist.) (Option to renew
with a landlord promise not to raise the monthly rental by more than $350 each year is
enforceable at the maximum increase). See also cases cited in Corbin, id., at 578.
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(ii) forgo his prerogative to demand a price greater than p. If the buyer
were willing to pay p, the seller would be considered retracting from
component (ii) of this agreement if he refused to accept it. 78 The
seller’s own acceptance of the range negates any reasonable grounds
for him to reject the best term within this range.
In cases in which parties agree to agree on a term but fail to
specify an explicit range, the same result of granting each party an
option to concede the other parties favorable term could be obtained if
courts were to supplement the agreement with an implied range. True,
this interpretation of the agreement takes us further from the parties’
actual will, to the domain of implied or hypothetical will. But as one
court explained:
“A court may not close its eyes to the truism that a landlord's
proper objective is to obtain the highest rent that a tenant
under all the circumstances can afford to pay.... When,
therefore, a tenant's option extension clause in a lease
contains a ceiling (i mplied or constructive in this instance)
upon the rent to be charged for the extended period and the
tenant is willing to pay that ceiling price, the landlord may
not be heard to challenge that option clause otherwise void
for uncertainty.” 79 (Emphasis added)
Given that the parties explicitly postponed the negotiation over the
renewal price, the fiction that consent to a “reasonable” price exists—
even if cautiously referred to as hypothetical consent—is surely more
ambitious than the presumption, stated by the court above, that the
landlord agreed not to demand more than the maximal plausible rent. It
may well be that the tenant hoped for a better outcome and would not
be interested in exercising the renewal option under such terms. But if
the tenant is interested, and is suing to renew the lease under the
“ceiling” price, is there any good reason to prefer the standard nonenforcement outcome?
C. Options for Renewal of Lease
One of the main areas in which the doctrine of indefiniteness has
been well tested is a lease contract with a tenant option to renew at
rental to be agreed upon at the time of renewal. While the majority of
courts still view these contracts as indefinite and unenforceable, a
growing trend is to allow the tenant to exercise the option even if the
________________________________________________________
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“When a bargained-for term of a renewal provision sets a range within which negotiations
must take place, the lessor may not render the renewal provision unenforceable simply by […]
insisting on rent exceeding the maximum allowed by the contract.” See Little Caesar
Enterprises v. Bell Canyon Shopping Center, 13 P.3d 600, 603 (Utah, 2000).
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negotiations over the renewal price fail, by using the fair market price
as gap filler. 80 Of course, the latter solution clearly violates the
landlord’s immunity, which he explicitly secured in the contract, from
non-consensual designation of the renta l price. Accordingly, courts
have occasionally considered a policy of allowing the tenant to renew
under the landlord’s maximal obtainable price. In such cases, the
tenant’s exercise price is sometimes equated with “the highest rent
which a responsible bidder is apt to offer”. 81
To be sure, this solution is not without difficulty. It suggests that
an option to renew under a price to be agreed upon would
automatically become an option to renew under the landlord’s
maximal price. But if the parties already thought about granting the
tenant an option (to renew), doesn’t their reluctance to state a renewal
price indicate that they did not seek to grant the tenant a one -sided
power to effectuate renewal? Indeed, the pro-defendant
supplementation of the option strains the language of the explicit
agreement. But it surely does less of injustice to the parties’ original
intent than the polar solutions usually reached of either average market
price or invalidation of the option altogether. While the landlord did
not grant the tenant an explicit option to renew at the maximal price, it
is unreasonable for him to defend by saying that he did not intend to be
bound to such interpretation.
One way the maximal price can be inferred by court is by looking
at other bids the landlord received from potential tenants, and equating
the renewal price to the highest rentable value.82 Like a right of first
refusal, the price is set at the highest value the landlord is offered
elsewhere. True, the proposed gap-filling standard is more than an
“implied” right of first refusal. Here, the tenant can compel the
transaction and does not have to wait for the landlord to initiate one.
But both an implied right of first refusal and an option to concede the
maximal price address the problem of indefiniteness by reference to
the “highest market value of the premises at the time of renewal”.83

________________________________________________________
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, 58 A.L.R.3d 500, supra note 72, § 2(a).
See, e.g., Moolenaar v. Co -Build Companies, 354 F.Supp. 980 (Restricting this formula to the
highest value under the original zoning restrictions.)
Diettrich v. Newberry Co ., 19 P.2d 115 (Wa. 1933); Di Maria v. Michaels, 90 A.D.2d 676
(N.Y.1982).
50 Am. Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant §1166 (1970), citing Arnot v. Alexander, 44 Mo. 25
(1869) (holding that the view that a fair rentable value is “different and may be something
more that its full or highest rentable market value” is erroneous.)
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Another way to implement the ‘highest -value’ formula is for the
court to pick the valuation assessed by the landlord’s expert witness. 84
In many of these suits, the tenant, while asking the court to supplement
the deal with a fair or reasonable rental price, provides some testimony
concerning the market price, usually on the lower end of the market
distribution. The landlord, trying to show that there does not exist one
“market price” and that the agreement is thus indefinite, provides
testimony concerning the high end of the market distribution. The fact
that both the landlord’s and the tenant’s information is valid does not
necessitate an outcome of no-enforcement. Rather, and consistent with
the courts’ stated purpose to protect the tenant’s bargain, the tenant
should be entitled to concede the landlord’s price.
These intermediate solutions, of enforcing an agreement to agree
while supplementing it with terms more favorable to the enforcedagainst party, are the exception. More often courts restrict their
attention to “all” -or-“nothing” solutions. Even when a tenant, say, is
willing to pay the maximal rent, “as much as any other responsible
party would pay”, the court may refuse to enforce the renewal option. 85
But often the underlying reason for the rejection of this
supplementation formula is not a rejection of the pro-defendant gap
filling logic, but rather a recognition that the highest price alone does
not exhaust the defendant’s concern. For example, a landlord may
unhappy even with the highest market price in light of the conduct of
the tenant. In these situations, the correct implementation of a prodefendant gap filler would require the impractical judic ial task of
ascertainment of such non-price concerns, which perhaps explains
some of the judicial resistance to the rule.
CONCLUSION
Building on an assortment of existing doctrines and gap-filling
practices, and seeking justification both on conceptual and economic
grounds, this Article developed a “pro-defendant” standard of gap filling
in incomplete contracts, potentially contributing to the general theory of
default rules in contract law.
There are several ways to think about the underpinnings of the
proposed approach. One way, which I explored in a previous essay, is to
think of contractual liability as arising, not from consensus between the
parties, but from each party’s separate and unilateral representation of

________________________________________________________
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serious intent to be bound. 86 Under this approach, a party cannot freely
retract from the terms and proposals she indicated would be acceptable to
her. If the basis of liability is divorced from consensus, each party could
be accountable for a different unilateral representation. And when a
party’s unilateral representation is incomplete, this ground of liability is
consistent only with supplementation that is favorable to the liable party,
since it is only to such terms that her intent to be bound can be safely
presumed.
The pro-defendant gap filling approach can also be viewed as a
challenge to the general idea of reasonable, or mid-range, resolutions of
disputes in contract law. Much of the law of remedies, for example, is
aimed at reaching reasonable, unbiased assessments of damages, often as
a prerequisite to granting any remedy at all. For example, expectation
damages are awarded only if sufficiently definite and certain, namely,
only if the assessment of lost profits can be made reasonably accurately.
Applying the logic developed in the Article, this all-or-nothing
approach—either damages are proven to be fair and reasonable, or no
damages will be recovered—can be questioned. In the context of
damages, even if the plaintiff failed to prove the lost expectation with
sufficient certainty, the default outcome should not be a complete bar
against recovery of expectation damages. Instead, the plaintiff should be
entitled to a recovery of such damages as prescribed by the formula most
favorable to the defendant. While this remedial burden may fail to
accurately reflect the plaintiff’s true loss, it is more accurate than the
denial of expectation damages altogether, and it guarantees that the
defendant is not held accountable to more than the loss he caused.
The analysis in this paper focused on conceptual and economic
justifications for the pro-defendant default rules. A more complete inquiry
into the merits of this approach would have to address additional aspects.
For example, it would have to explore in greater depth bargaining
practices and the extent to which they are consistent with the fundamental
no-going-back norm underlying the proposed regime. Additionally, the
inquiry can extend to other areas of legal doctrine in which default rule
theory proved useful, and explore the value of gap filling in the manner
most favorable to the “liable” parties.

________________________________________________________
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See Omri Ben- Shahar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis for Contractual
Liability, Forthcoming 152 U. of Pa. L. Rev. (2004).
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